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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MEETS HEALTH LAW: 
INEXTRICABLE PAIRING OR MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE? 
ALEX M. AZAR II* 
Thank you.  It’s an honor to be here.  Eric asked me to speak with you 
about the Administration’s health-care priorities and how they intersect with 
administrative law.  It is, of course, odd to speak about administrative law as 
“meeting” health law, at least when you look at health law as I must, from the 
Government’s perspective.  Administrative law is our life’s blood.  We can’t 
do anything without considering administrative law, from a press release, to a 
guidance, to a rule.  For administrative law consists, at least in my mind, to a 
great extent of the questions “Do we have the substantive constitutional, 
statutory, or regulatory authority to do what we are doing?” and “Are we 
following the statutorily mandated procedures to do what we are doing?” 
Today, I’d like to give you my personal perspective on the recent 
movement of the courts in the field of administrative law and how it impacts 
the work of an agency’s general counsel.  I’d also like to give you some 
background on the recently enacted Medicare Modernization Act and discuss 
some of the important administrative law modifications contained therein.1 
I.  THE RISE OF TEXTUALISM IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
From an agency perspective, the key development in administrative law 
over the last few decades has been the rise of textualism in statutory 
interpretation.  Courts today tend to approach statutes by assessing the plain 
meaning of the text.  In so doing, they refer to traditional canons and tools of 
statutory construction.  In cases of ambiguity, some courts will resort to 
legislative history.  They tend not to rely as much on the purpose of the statute 
as they once did.  It is no longer sufficient for an agency to justify its action by 
declaring an intention to protect the public health and noting that the statute 
does not explicitly preclude a particular interpretation.  As the Supreme Court 
said in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., “[r]egardless of how 
 
* General Counsel, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Keynote Address delivered 
at the 16th Annual Health Law Symposium of the Center for Health Law Studies and the Saint 
Louis University Law Journal on March 26, 2004. 
 1. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, 177 Stat. 2066 [hereinafter Medicare Modernization Act]. 
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serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to address, however, it may 
not exercise its authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.”2 
And although the courts continue to speak in terms of deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of the statutes which are entrusted to it to interpret, 
implement, and administer, agency action today is subject to closer scrutiny by 
the courts.  This is illustrated by United States v. Mead Corp.,3 where the 
Supreme Court held that certain agency actions were not entitled to Chevron 
deference4 but only to Skidmore deference5—that is, deference in proportion to 
its power to persuade. 
Finally, the courts—and the Office of Management and Budget—are 
closely scrutinizing, and with increasing skepticism, agency action 
accomplished not through notice-and-comment rulemaking but through 
guidance documents.  There are at least two recent D.C. Circuit cases that 
invalidated guidance documents because the documents were really legislative 
rules that should have been promulgated through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  These are Appalachian Power Company v. EPA6 and General 
Electric v. EPA.7 
In Appalachian Power, the court concluded that the EPA guidance at issue 
imposed obligations on State regulators and the regulated community that 
could not be traced to the Clean Air Act or EPA’s implementing regulations.8  
It so held even though the guidance contained a “boilerplate” disclaimer at the 
end of the document that “[t]he policies set forth in this paper are intended 
solely as guidance, do not represent final Agency action, and cannot be relied 
upon to create any rights enforceable by any party.”9 The Court found that the 
document clearly created obligations.10 
In General Electric v. EPA, the court concluded that the relevant EPA 
guidance document was a legislative rule because, as a practical matter, it 
bound applicants for approval of PCB clean-up plans to consider certain health 
risks by certain methods and the EPA to accept applications meeting certain 
criteria.11  The court noted that its cases “make clear that an agency 
pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical matter if it either 
appears on its face to be binding, . . . or is applied by the agency in a way that 
 
 2. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
 3. 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
 4. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 5. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1999). 
 6. 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 7. 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 8. Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1028. 
 9. Id. at 1023. 
 10. Id. 
 11. General Electric, 290 F.3d at 384. 
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indicates that it is binding.”12  The “mandatory language of a document alone 
can be sufficient to render it binding.”13 
The courts are not the only ones scrutinizing agencies’ use of guidance.  
OMB is also taking a hard look at agency guidance.  OMB has an obligation, 
under the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, to promote recommendations for 
reforming the regulatory process and agency rules, as well as general duties to 
manage the efficiency and integrity of the regulatory process.14  In OMB’s 
2002 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations,15 OMB discussed its “Review of Problematic Agency Guidance.”  
It solicited public comment on problematic agency guidance, including those 
that “alter rights or impose obligations and costs not fairly discernible from the 
underlying statute or legislative rule that the document purports to interpret or 
implement.”16 
As agency counsel, I and my lawyers have taken these developments in 
administrative law very much to heart in how we advise our clients.  Clients 
always want to do things quickly, especially when you are dealing with the 
public health and welfare, as we are in just about everything we do.  But we try 
to convince our clients that it will serve their interests by doing things the right 
way.  Often, this means using notice-and-comment rulemaking, which can be a 
long and arduous process.  Many times our clients respond that they have in 
the past done the same thing through so-called “subregulatory documents,” 
such as guidance and policy statements.  But we ask them: Why give your 
opponents the chance to undo your good work by simply challenging a 
procedural flaw, without having to challenge your underlying substantive 
position?  Don’t give them a neutral and easy way to stop you in your tracks 
and embarrass you.  In addition, learn from Mead that if you go through the 
rigors of notice-and-comment rulemaking, you will get deference to 
ambiguous terms.17  And what you establish by rulemaking is much harder for 
your successors to undo. 
We are constantly reminding our clients about the lessons of Appalachian 
Power18 and GE19: Guidance must genuinely be guidance.  We often cite the 
 
 12. Id. at 383. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(3)[624], 114 Stat. 
2763, 2763A-161 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §1105 (2003) note).  The Regulatory Right-to-Know Act 
was implemented through the OMB Circular.  See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003). 
 15. 67 Fed. Reg. 15014 (March 28, 2002). 
 16. Id. at 15035. 
 17. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 18. 208 F.3d at 1015. 
 19. 290 F.3d at 377. 
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example of the FDA’s good guidance practices,20 in which every guidance 
must state that the document “contains nonbinding recommendations” and that 
“[i]t does not create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not 
operate to bind FDA or the public.”21  Moreover, the guidance notes that “an 
alternative approach [can be used] if the approach satisfies the requirements of 
the applicable statutes and regulations.”22  And these can’t be hollow words; 
they must actually be how the agency implements and understands its 
guidance. 
We also encourage our clients to consider the enlightening and democratic 
value of notice and comment.  This applies even in the guidance context, as the 
FDA does under its good guidance practices.  For all of our talent, we are not 
the sole repository of learning on the subjects that we regulate.  We can learn 
from public comment, and we can often achieve desired policy outcomes in 
better ways based on what we have learned.  I encourage this approach even 
when dealing with legal interpretation issues.  If policy-makers wish to achieve 
a particular policy result but we are having difficulty reaching that result as a 
matter of legal interpretation, I often suggest that we lay the issue out for the 
public, explain our legal quandary, and ask for assistance as to how to “get 
there” if that is indeed possible.  At the FDA, we even put out a notice very 
early on that asked for public comment on the implications of the courts’ 
recent First Amendment jurisprudence on FDA’s regulatory practices. 
II.  MODERNIZING MEDICARE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Given their size and complexity, the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
raise a whole host of administrative law issues.  In our effort to increase access 
to care over the past three years, we have, through Medicare and Medicaid 
waivers and state plan amendments, allowed states to expand access to health 
coverage for more than 2.6 million people and to expand the range of benefits 
offered to 6.7 million other Americans.23  Although our waiver and 
demonstration project authorities under Medicare and Medicaid vest us with 
great discretion, many of these waivers—which involve waiving otherwise 
applicable statutory restrictions—present very unique and challenging 
administrative law issues.  A major issue is whether states may impose prior 
approval requirements for the receipt of drugs by Medicaid recipients from 
pharmaceutical companies who refuse to enter into supplemental agreements 
 
 20. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures: Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. §§ 
7, 10, 14, 19, 25, 101, 107, 110, 114, 170, 310, 312, 314, 316, 500, 514, 601, 803, 814, 860 
(2000). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Tommy, G. Thompson, Address to the Blank Rome Health Leadership Forum (Feb. 17, 
2004) (transcript available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2004/040217.html). 
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with states—beyond those already required under federal law for drugs sold to 
Medicaid beneficiaries—to provide rebates or discounts for non-Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  CMS determined that states would first have to seek the 
Secretary’s approval under a state plan amendment to their Medicaid program 
and demonstrate a nexus to the Medicaid program; in other words, they would 
have to show how this arrangement would benefit the Medicaid program.24  
This position was vindicated in 2003 by the Supreme Court in Pharmaceutical 
Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh.25  We also approved two 
Michigan programs that obtained supplemental rebates related to certain 
targeted low-income, non-Medicaid beneficiary populations; however, 
PhRMA sued us.26  The District Court upheld our determination that these 
programs benefited Medicaid program by preventing low-income individuals 
from becoming Medicaid beneficiaries.27  It is now on appeal to the D.C. 
Circuit.28 
The waiver programs, of course, pale in comparison to the recently passed 
modernization of Medicare.  For me, this is the most exciting possible time to 
be working at HHS.  The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003,29 or MMA as we call it, promises to completely 
transform this program and bring twenty-first century medicine to the forty-
year-old Medicare program. 
For the first time, Medicare will offer a comprehensive prescription drug 
benefit to seniors, what is now called Part D of Medicare, starting in 2006.  
Seniors will be able to save money almost immediately through Medicare-
endorsed drug discount cards.  Estimates are that these cards will provide 
savings of 10 to 25%.  Low-income seniors will get $600 on this card in each 
of 2004 and 2005 for their drug purchases.30  These seniors will pay 5 to 10% 
coinsurance on discounted drug purchases using this transitional assistance.  
 
 24. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 650 (2003). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46–47 (D. D.C. 
2003). 
 27. Id. at 85. 
 28. On April 2, 2004, the week following the author’s presentation, the D.C. Circuit decided 
this appeal in favor of the government.  See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am.. v. Thompson, 
362 F.3d 817 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 29. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat 2066 (2003). 
 30. Medicare Drug Card: Delivering Savings for Participating Beneficiaries: Hearing on 
Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Program Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 108th Cong. 
(2004) (forthcoming) (statement of Mark McClellan, Administrator, Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing060804.htm). 
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Just yesterday, the Secretary announced the approval of 31 national cards, 19 
regional cards, and cards from 43 Medicare Advantage organizations.31 
The drug card has something of a sordid administrative law history.  
Shortly before I took office, CMS attempted to create a Medicare-endorsement 
program for pharmacy-benefits managers with established discount cards.  
CMS attempted to set up this program by a guidance document, which 
contained endorsement criteria and required that the endorsed cards participate 
in a consortium to share certain beneficiary information.32  In a preliminary 
injunction order, the District Court in D.C. held that this initiative most likely 
created rights and obligations on private parties and, therefore, should have 
been subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking.  It also found—on a 
preliminary basis—that CMS lacked the statutory authority to create an 
endorsement program.  In response, CMS refined its program and put it out for 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  In that rulemaking, we provided an 
extensive discussion of CMS’s comprehensive beneficiary education and 
assistance program authorities; of the requirements that formed the basis for 
this program; and of the program’s purposes to bring drug discounts to 
beneficiaries on uncovered drugs, to enable them to avoid the need for more 
expensive Medicare medical care, and to inform them of their options.33  In 
doing so, it was our position that we had followed Mead,34 that greater 
deference is due to an agency’s statutory interpretations when it has engaged in 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and that we should win because of deference 
under Chevron step two.35  The court again disagreed.  In a ruling delivered 
from the bench, the court ruled against us under Chevron step one.  We noticed 
an appeal, which then was mooted out by Congress’s enactment of the MMA. 
Speaking of which: In 2006, the comprehensive prescription drug benefit 
under the MMA will be available to seniors for about $35 a month.36  Seniors 
will have a $250 deductible, and then Medicare will pay 75% of the costs 
between $250 and $2,250.37  Seniors will pay 100% of the drug costs above 
total drug spending of $2,250 until they reach total drug spending of $5,100, of 
which $3,600 must be out-of-pocket spending.38  After they have reached that 
 
 31. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Gives Seal of Approval to 
Medicare Drug Discount Cards (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/ 
2004pres/20040325.html. 
 32. Emergency Clearance: Public Information Collection Requirements Submitted to the 
Office of Management and Budget, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,564, 37, 566 (July 18, 2001). 
 33. Medicare Program; Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 
Fed. Reg. 10,262 (Mar. 6, 2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403). 
 34. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 35. Id. at 226–27. 
 36. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2072. 
 37. Id. at 2077. 
 38. Id. 
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limit, beneficiaries will pay the greater of 5% or $2 per generic drug and $5 for 
branded drugs.39 
There’s reduced cost sharing for low-income seniors.  It’s been estimated 
that the average senior currently without drug coverage will save about 50% on 
their drug spending, and low-income seniors will save even more.40  Unlike 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare, this new benefit will be provided through 
private insurance companies and pharmacy-benefit managers, not a new 
government bureaucracy. 
Similarly, there will be a larger role for private health delivery systems—
meaning PPOs and managed care companies—in delivering health-care 
choices to Medicare beneficiaries through the newly renamed Medicare 
Advantage program.  Beneficiaries will now be able to choose regional PPOs 
and enhanced HMOs.  These plans will have the flexibility to offer additional 
benefits and customized beneficiary cost sharing. 
MMA is also offering important new preventive services.  In 2005, seniors 
will be able to get diabetes and heart disease screenings, and new beneficiaries 
will receive a “Welcome to Medicare Physical” that includes screenings and 
referrals to disease management programs.41  In addition, MMA created tax 
incentives for individuals to purchase—and the marketplace to provide—
health savings accounts.  These accounts enable Americans to save for future 
medical expenses, tax-free. 
With this background in mind, I’d like to discuss several changes that 
MMA makes in the application of administrative law to the Medicare program.  
The APA was enacted in 1946 to establish, among other things, “a pattern 
designed to achieve relative uniformity in the administrative machinery of the 
Federal Government.”42  While these basic APA procedures have worked well, 
Congress has from time to time created agency-specific standards and 
procedures.  The Social Security Act already contained several particular 
administrative law provisions, such as a requirement that generally a sixty-day 
comment period is required for notice-and-comment rulemaking.43 
The MMA made several important changes.  First, HHS and OMB are 
required to establish and publish a regular timeline for the publication of final 
regulations based on the previous publication of an NPRM or an interim final 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Proposes New Rules to 
Deliver Better Benefits and Savings on Drugs for Medicare Beneficiaries (July 26, 2004), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040706.html. 
 41. Medicare: Issue of the Day, Welcome to Medicare Physical (January 06, 2004), 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicare reform/issueoftheday/01062004iotd.pdf. 
 42. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Introduction to 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947), available 
at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/refrnc/agintro.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2000). 
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regulation.44  CMS has to publish a notice in the Federal Register if it is unable 
to make the timeline for a particular regulation, including an explanation of the 
variance from the timeline, and if it does not publish a notice of continuance 
for an interim final rule, the rule will not remain in effect. 
Second, the timeline from publication of an NPRM or an interim final 
regulation cannot exceed three years—except under exceptional circumstances.  
This is, in fact, consistent with a departmental initiative to withdraw out-of-
date NPRMs so that resources can be deployed more efficiently.  For example, 
the FDA published an NPRM a year ago in which it proposed to withdraw 88 
NPRMs, many of which had been issued decades ago but were still on the 
books.45 
Third, the MMA codifies for Medicare current administrative law on 
logical outgrowth: If a provision in a final regulation is not the logical 
outgrowth of a previous NPRM or interim final regulation, the provision will 
be treated as a proposed regulation and shall not take effect until there is an 
opportunity for public comment on the provision and a final rule is then 
issued.46 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, MMA also grants CMS the power 
under certain circumstances to engage in retroactive rulemaking.47  Under the 
APA, rulemaking is generally prospective in nature—and, in 1988, the 
Supreme Court specifically held, 9 to 0, in Bowen v. Georgetown University 
Hospital—that the Secretary lacked the authority to issue retroactive rules 
under the Medicare Act.48  MMA changes that somewhat.  Substantive changes 
in regulations, manual instructions, interpretative rules, statements of policy, 
and guidelines of general applicability can be applied retroactively if the 
Secretary determines that (1) retroactive application is necessary to comply 
with statutory requirements or (2) the failure to apply the change retroactively 
would be contrary to the public interest.49 
Finally, if a Medicare provider or supplier follows certain erroneous 
written guidance provided by the Department or a Medicare contractor acting 
within the scope of its authority, the provider or supplier may seek to avoid 
penalties or interest on some overpayments.50  This provides relief that was not 
previously available under the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. 
Community Health Services of Crawford County.51 
 
 44. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 177 Stat. 2066, 2375 (2003). 
 45. Withdrawl of Certain Proposed Rules and Other Proposed Actions; Notice of Intent, 68 
Fed. Reg. 19,766 (proposed Apr. 22, 2003). 
 46. Medicare Modernization Act, 117 Stat. at 2375. 
 47. Id. at 2376. 
 48. 488 U.S. 204, 209 (1988). 
 49. Medicare Modernization Act, 117 Stat. at 2376. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 467 U.S. 51 (1984). 
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I hope this sense of an agency general counsel’s perspective on 
administrative law has been somewhat helpful.  These are exciting times to be 
in public service and historic times to be working with the panoply of public 
health and welfare issues that HHS faces every day.  I very much appreciate 
the opportunity to meet with you today about some of those issues.  Thank 
you. 
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